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BOOK REVEW
JuDGE LEARNED HAND AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDIClARY. By
KATHRYN GRIFFITH. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma

Press, 1973. Pp. 251. $8.95.
WiLLIAm

F.

SWINDLER*

Few American jurists-and perhaps only one who was not a member
of the Supreme Court-merit the cliche of becoming legends in their
own time. There is definitely one, however, and his name was Billings
Learned Hand (1872-1962), who not only inspired encomia in law
reviews and popular magazines but encomia prepared by some of the
leading figures of the profession.1 In the dozen years since his death,
there have been three admiring and admirable books about him: The
Art and Craft of Judging, a thoughtfully edited collection of his most
insightful opinions; 2 Learned Hand's Court, a unique study of the Second Circuit in what now seems a golden age of the cousins Learned and
Augustus Hand, Jerome Frank, and Thomas Swan;3 and this latest work,
a study in the development of a judicial philosophy which skillfully
integrated the spirit of the age with the practical requirements of expounding the law on a wide variety of subjects.
This same objective, of course, inspired Shanks' collection and underlay the painstaking analysis by Schick of the accomplishments of the
Second Circuit. One must lift an eyebrow, in fact, upon noting that
neither of these valuable predecessors to Dr. Griffith's study has been
acknowledged. Another missing reference, which certainly would lend

0 LL.B., University of Nebraska; Ph.D., University of Missouri. Professor of Law,
The College of William and Mary.
1. E.g., Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 370 (1947); Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. Cm. L. REv.
666 (1957); Frankfurter, Learned Hand, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1961); Wyzanski, Learned
Hand, ATLAc M oNTHLY, Dec. 1961, at 54. A 1947 issue of the Harvard Law Review
containing a collection of articles praising Judge Hand was dedicated to "Judge Learned
Hand, whose wisdom and eloquence have made his seventy-fifth birthday an occasion
to be celebrated by all who serve the law . . . ." 60 HARv. L. REv. 325 (1947).
2. Tn ART AND CRATT oF JUDGING (H. Shanks ed. 1968).

3. M. ScmcK, LumqED HAND's CouRT (1970).
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itself to the perspective of Hand and his concepts, is Cardozo's classic,
4
The Nature of the Judicial Process.
All that aside, however, it remains to commend this as a study in
political philosophy-that, rather than jurisprudence or legal philosophy,
if there is an ultimate difference between the two. Dr. Griffith begins
with the natural questions: What made Learned Hand unique? What
specifically 'was his philosophy? How has it stood the test of rapidly
changing times? She has undertaken to reach her answers by a summation of his writings on various seminal topics-the nature of the
judicial function, the standards of constitutional freedoms which ought
to guide the courts, the relation of the judicial to the legislative and,
less frequently, the executive branches of government.
Perhaps the most useful chapter in the book is the tenth, entitled
"American Political Thought," in which a background for evaluating
Hand's thought is created by tracing the fundamental shifting of national convictions from the natural rights assumptions of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries to the relativism and pragmatism of the tventieth. "At the beginning of the twentieth century," Dr. Griffith writes,
"political philosophers became acutely conscious of the limits of scientific discovery based strictly upon the tools of science, such as observation, measurement, and logical reasoning." 5 Under the impact of totalitarian iconoclasms, it appeared necessary to concede that the scientific
method was not equipped to establish the validity of the basic assumptions upon which American traditions had been built.' The alternative
was a second-generation school of pragmatism, so to speak-an acceptance of the legitimacy of diversified premises, a skepticism toward
claims that any one premise offered the ultimate solution for anything,
7
and accordingly a tolerance for the contradictory and controversial.
To ascribe this frame of mind to Hand is essentially to say that he
was one with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Frankfurter. To demonstrate that he, as they, could articulate these convictions and integrate them into judicial decision is to emphasize how great
an intellectual task he accomplished in a smaller arena. The other jurists
spoke from the eminence of the Supreme Court, and that bench itself
lent authority to what they said. Learned Hand spoke from the inter4. B. CAmozo, Tih NATuRE OF Tm JuDicuAL PRocEss (1921).
5. K. GRrFIi,
JUDGE LEARNED HAND Am nm Rol oF
(1973).
6. Id. at 187-88.
7. Id. at 190-91.

Tm

FEDERAL JuDICIARY

187

1974]

BOOK REVIEW

mediate bench (although admittedly one of the two most important
circuits, along with the District of Columbia), and his eloquence lent
authority to his court.
To students of efficient and effective judicial administration, it has
seemed regrettable that Hand in fact was never "elevated" to the Supreme Court. The most common explanation is possibly simplistic:
when he was the right age, the appointing authority, the President, was
unsympathetic with his philosophy; when the appointing authority was
sympathetic, he was presumed to be past the desired age." But a more
relevant observation is that the intermediate courts-where, despite the
complaints of Supreme Court workloads, the majority of appellate business is done and finally disposed of-need judges of the caliber of the
Second Circuit in its great age. Indeed, the key to the quality of justice
administered in the federal judicial system today may ultimately be
recognized as limited by the caliber of circuit court appointments fully
as much as it is affected by Supreme Court appointments.9
This brings us back to the initial question: How does a great jurist
emerge, and what shapes his principles of law, on a particular bench?
What were the qualities that have made Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court a figure among state appellate court judges comparable in stature to Judge Hand? It may be accepted that Traynor's
contribution to modem American law has been the logic of legal analysis as a craft, 10 where Hand's judicial performance has been, as Shanks
accurately characterized it, an art as well as a craft." If there was an
element of luck in Hand's story, it was, as Schick emphasizes, the remarkable assemblage of several keen minds in Hand's court at the same
time.' But when all this is said, it remains evident that the man himself
was unique: he discerned the intellectual needs of his own age, when
familiar and accustomed landmarks were disappearing and the public
interest in general and the law in particular required a new synthesis
of principles of applied justice.
Dr. Griffith's primary concern, as the tite of her book indicates, is
the function of the judiciary, and especially the federal judiciary, in
8. But cf. Note, Politics of the Appointment Process: An Analysis of Why Learned
Hand Was Never Appointed to the Supreme Court, 25 STAN. L. REv. 251 (1973).
9. Cf. P. Fisu, Tim PoLITics oF FEDEAL JuDcuL ADMmIsRAnON (1973).
10. Cf. Traynor, La rude vita, la dolce giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good
Law, 29 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 223 (1962).
11. Tim ART AND CRArr oF JuDGn G, supra note 2.
12. M. Scmnm, supra note 3, at 5-38, 348-55.

WILLIAM. AND MARY LAW REVIEW

the administration of justice. The main part of her study is subtitled
"The Federal Judiciary-Motor or Brake?" and presumably it is this
particular aspect of applied justice that she finds most persuasively
treated by her biographee. She sees Hand, like Frankfurter, as a zealous
advocate of judicial restraint; in Hand's view, the judge should not be
transfigured into "a crusader for righteousness as righteousness may
appear to his incandescent conscience," '3 for this threatens to blind
the members of the court to "the purposes and ideals of those parts of
the common society whose interests are discordant with [their] own." 14
This viewpoint led Judge Hand logically into Bill of Rights questions, where he strove for a pragmatic alternative to the vague natural
rights declarations of "self-evident" and "inalienable" principles. In this
he was opposed to the absolutist values of Justice Black and closer to
the rule of reason espoused by Justice Harlan. He was similarly opposed to the judicial activism of the Warren Court, considering it a
needless complication of already complex issues which the legislature
rather than the judiciary ought to resolve. Incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment was for him a proposition
of even greater doubtfulness. He was the ultimate Holmesian: "He
had no illusions about the difficulty of preserving democracy," Dr. Griffith observes, "and yet he possessed a high hope and a certain faith in
its endurance. His view that trial and error and experimentation are
the only paths to truth accounts for his willingness to permit the legislature freedom to experiment within the boundaries established by the
Constitution." "'

Thus the great judge: accepting as a first principle the necessity for
tolerance of widely diverging viewpoints and, as a corollary, the right
of the majority to act within a representative assembly under the guidelines of a written constitution. For the activists, the principle set out
in the Constitution was the starting point; Hand would add, the starting
point for the legislative, representative branch of the government. Hand
did not share Cardozo's conviction that in the absence of legislative
action the courts should be guided by a consensus as to social ends to
be served; and yet, when the time came to test the legislative action
against the principle expressed in the Constitution, Hand likewise came
down on the side of the angels.
13. K. Gmai~rm, supra note 5, at 89.
14. Id. at 90.
15. Id. at 140

